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Abstract
The accords were signed by Israel, the United Arab
Emirates, and Bahrain. This marks the first Persian
Gulf state and the third/fourth Arab state to normalize
Israeli relations. These agreements proclaim that
each state recognizes the sovereignty of the other,
promotes peace, coexistence, and encourages
These accords open a door to further Israeli
recognition by other Arab states. What conditions
allowed for these accords? Mutual
concerns/interests concerning Iran’s increasing
influence in the region was the key reason for the
mediation’s success. Ripe moment theory needs to
be implemented in analyzing the conditions that led
to the successful mediation. The independent need
to be analyzed and argues that the underlying
conditions (economic and security related) of the
parties created the ripe moment for the accords.

Ripe Moment Theory
1. Coined by William Zartman in 1985
2. When dealing with conflict between parties,
specifically long-term conflicts, there is a specific
time that negotiations are possible
1. Hurting Stalemate
2. Looming catastrophe
Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain have
met these conditions
This ripeness is not enough for full scale negotiations
Conditions must be taken advantage either by these
states themselves or through a mediator, a role the
United States acted as.

Figure 1. Title: Signing of the Accords
Representatives of the United States, Israel,
Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates sign the
Abraham Accords

Contributing Factors
Relationship between Saudi Arabia
and Israel/ Security Incentive:
1. Ties that have formed over the years
between Saudi Arabia and Israel
because of the increasing threat Iran
is becoming in the region
2. Iranian revolution encouraged Shi’i
protests and revolts in Saudi Arabi,
Bahrain, and Kuwait.
3. Iran has sponsors terrorist
organizations such as Hezbollah.
4. Arab Spring created Cold War
between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
5. They have a common regional
adversary, both states began to see
one another in a less antagonistic
light and form a light partnership
6. Bahrain depends on Saudi Arabia for
security

Economic Incentive

Mediation

Economic Prospects (Billions)
3.60

Bahrain

1.41
8.80
119.67

Israel

20.00
403.96
257.39

UAE

22.76
449.13
385.88

Saudi Arabia

67.60
796.20
1.00

Total Exports

10.00

100.00

Military Spending

1000.00

GDP (Nominal)

Figure 3.
Displays the total number of money made from
exports within the UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia,
and Israel. Shows the economic benefits of an
alliance, especially Bahrain.

1. Will allow for previously private
economic dealings to be carried out
Initiaters of
publicly, and therefore expanded in all
Peace
Positively Impacted Negatively Impacted
areas
Israel
Saudi Arabia
Iran
2. Eager to gain access to Israel
espionage technology and military
Bahrain
Jordan
Turkey
advancements
UAE
Egypt
Palestinian Groups
3. Desire for economic growth within the
U.S.A.
Jordan
countries was brought to the forefront
Figure 2. Security Impacts of the Accords
due
to
the
Covid
caused
economic
Shows the differing regional shifts and Arab
crisis
priority. The Palestinians see this as a betrayal to
their interests and the Iranians see this as a further4. There is no distinction between
business and politics
security threat.

1. Bahrain and the UAE had already
established that they desired an end
to the conflict or a “way out” policy
1. Informal mediations had
been taking place between
these three states for years
2. Could not talk to Israel publicly
without being suspected of leaving
boycott
1. Israel was making no
progress regarding
Palestinian relations
2. Track II diplomacy was the
only option
3. The United States was asked to be
the official mediator
1. Both states had mutual trust
for the U.S.
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Table displays the increased approval for Israeli
cooperation that has risen significantly from
2015. It is this increased public approval rating
that has allowed for the Accords.

Conclusion

Additional Factors to Consider

1. This hurting stalemate was the states of Bahrain and the
UAE coming to the realization that their economic and
military need to cooperate openly with Israel supersedes
their desire to stay in the boycott.
2. Iran has become too much of a threat for them to overlook,
their looming catastrophe
3. Objective elements that contributed to this stalemate was
the tentative partnership that Israel and Saudi Arabia has
established that allowed the GCC to start cooperation
4. The informal mediation had been taking place for years;
these accords to were more of an evolution than a
revolution.

1. Oslo Accords in 1992
2. The Failure of the Iranian Nuclear Deal
3. The peace treaties between Israel and the individual states of
Egypt and Jordan
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